Global Admin Audit

Count the keys to the kingdom and account for every one of them: who holds top-level admin,
who granted admin recently, and which of those facts nobody can explain. Report and
recommend only — role removals go through the client's change process. Work it in order:

1. Enumerate current holders of global/company administrator and equivalent top-tier roles
   from the identity posture in Liongard. Compare the count to the working benchmark: a
   small number of dedicated admin accounts (typically 2–4) plus a documented break-glass
   account — not day-to-day user accounts wearing admin.
2. Pull recent admin-role changes: grants and removals from Liongard's detection and
   timeline data where available, with actor, target, and timestamp.
3. Authorized-change cross-check for every current admin and every recent grant: search for
   the change, onboarding, or project ticket that explains it — the boring explanation gets
   checked before the alarming one.
4. Flag, ranked: admins or grants with NO authorizing ticket and no client confirmation
   (unexplained privilege); admin accounts without MFA (critical, regardless of
   explanation); shared or generic admin accounts (no individual accountability);
   day-to-day user accounts holding standing admin (candidates for separate admin accounts
   or just-in-time elevation); break-glass account missing, undocumented, or used for
   routine work.
5. An unexplained RECENT grant is not a report line — it is a live lead: verify with the
   client's authorized contact immediately, and if unclaimed, treat the granting account as
   suspected compromised and escalate to account-takeover-runbook rather than finishing the
   report.
6. Output per-client findings, flagged items first, each with evidence and a
   recommendation. Document what was checked and the decision reasoning in the note.

Guardrails — always:
- Cross-check before alarm — most unexpected admins are undocumented-but-legitimate; say
  "unexplained," not "unauthorized," until the client confirms.
- Never close the loop on assumption: an admin nobody claims stays flagged until someone
  with authority claims it.
- An unclaimed recent grant escalates immediately — when in doubt, escalate; a false
  escalation is cheap, a missed compromise isn't.
- Report and recommend only; role removals go through the client's change process.
- Degradation: Liongard absent → the audit can only cover what tickets and the client
  attest; label the output "attestation-based, not instrumented." Never invent account
  data.